#Moral decision making model how to#

While the definition of implicit ethical agent meets that of artificial moral agent (AMA), the definition of explicit ethical agent meets the definition of artificial autonomous moral agent (AAMA).Ĭertainly, the more ambitious objective within the field of machine ethics is to “create a machine that is an explicit ethical agent” (Ibid.). Correspondingly, Moor defines “explicit ethical agent” as a machine that is “able to calculate the best action in ethical dilemmas using ethical principles” by itself (Anderson and Anderson, 2007, p. According to Moor, “implicit ethical agent” is a machine that “has been programmed to behave ethically” by following some ethical principles as embodied by its designer. In the current article, two types of ethical intelligent agents are examined, namely, the so-called by Moor implicit and explicit ethical agents (Moor, 2006, pp. The plurality of combined approaches towards specifying what an ethical intelligent agent should look like requires some limitations to be provided.

#Moral decision making model how to#

That is why the challenge consists in specifying how to create “an ethical intelligent agent” (Ibid.). This is due to the fact that “ethics has not been completely codified” (Ibid.). 15), nor would experts find easy solutions. The two questions provoke some additional questions such as the following: Does it mean that the engineers should create a machine that is sufficiently intelligent and then try to elaborate upon its intelligence in respect to morally significant matters? Or should they try to develop a certain type of intelligence that goes hand in hand with a given type of morality?Īnderson and Anderson make the point that “having all the information and facility in the world won’t, by itself, generate ethical behavior in a machine” (Anderson and Anderson, 2007, p. It means to modify them into “Whose morality?” and “Which rationality?”, while discussing the role of moral reasoning in building moral machines. In turn, it is methodologically important one to raise MacIntyre’s well-known questions, “Whose justice?” and “Which rationality?” in a new voice. As such a principle, one can point out that of “how we might program computers that will themselves refrain from evil and perhaps promote good” (Powers, 2006, p. Those principles should guide it in making decisions about possible courses of action it could take (Ibid.). The ultimate goal of machine ethics is “to create a machine that itself follows an ideal ethical principle or set of principles”. According to Anderson and Anderson, unlike computer ethics, which has traditionally discussed ethical issues “surrounding humans’ use of machines”, machine ethics is focused upon “ensuring that the behavior of machines towards human users, and perhaps other machines as well, is ethically acceptable” (Anderson and Anderson, 2007, p. Footnote 1īefore trying to clarify the role of some key concepts, it is important to roughly delineate the boundaries of machine ethics as such. In this context, special attention should be paid to the issue of whether or not algorithmic decision-making can achieve a level of moral autonomy similar to that of human decision-making. It is due to the fact that such a decision-making process necessitates the differentiation of the requirements for moral agency when applied to humans and intelligent agents (IAs). It is not an accident that decision-making based upon algorithms remains “a standout question in machine ethics” (Mittelstadt et al., 2016, p. The possibility of weak “moral” AI scenarios is likewise discussed critically. By comparing and contrasting the three first-order normative theories, and by clarifying the gist of the differences between the processes of calculation and moral estimation, the possibility for building what-one might call strong “moral” AI scenarios-is questioned. Those are Powers’ prospect for a Kantian machine, Anderson and Anderson’s reinterpretation of act utilitarianism and Howard and Muntean’s prospect for a moral machine based on a virtue ethical approach. For the purposes of exemplifying some of the difficulties in arguing for implicit and explicit ethical agents in Moor’s sense, three first-order normative theories in the field of machine ethics are put to test.

Specifically, research focuses on clarifying why even if one assumes the existence of well-working ethical intelligent agents in epistemic terms, it does not necessarily mean that they meet the requirements of autonomous moral agents, such as human beings.

Moral implications of the decision-making process based on algorithms require special attention within the field of machine ethics.